Reflections on Nobel Week: Democracy and the Usefulness of Useless Knowledge
by Jimmy Freiberg
The IYTT engaging with NOBEL
Two things were first impressed upon me as I stood before the great Svenska Mässan, the exhibition center where the 2025 Nobel Week Dialogues were held: Firstly, this skyscraper towered above all other buildings in the region, thus asserting itself as a place of prominence where prominent things happen. Secondly, the laminated glass windows mirrored, in bleak reflection, a nearby amusement park (“Liseberg”), harboring the image of a Ferris wheel and Christmas tree, blemishing this whole affair with an air of whimsicality and play, characteristics which I intend to demonstrate are very integral to the most cherished features of the Nobel enterprise.
What makes a Nobel Prize winner? Naturally, this was the first question that occurred to me as I stepped inside anticipating the dialogues. What distinguishes a Nobel laureate from the rest of the population? Is it the possession of natural talent? Or, the opposite, was it social standing and fortune that set them upon the Nobel path? After all, it is obligatory that we mention the Nobel Prize’s terrible track record with diversity here, with only about three percent of Nobel Prize science awardees being women in the 119 years of its existence, and, to this date, no Black scientists ever being awarded the science Prize. It is apparent, then, that privilege is part of the makings of a Nobel Prize winner – yet, can we say that this exhausts the Prize, or is there a certain kind of thought characteristic of laureates that, although largely unrecognized in marginalized populations, can be found within many of the Prize’s winners? These questions prompted me to hold “open chair democracy talks” (OCDTs) in the little time I could find between sessions and during coffee breaks. In the OCDTs, I asked several guests of the Nobel week dialogues a few questions pertaining to democracy, not merely as an institution, but as an ideal against which questions of personal freedom, agency, and belonging can be posed.
As time constraints would have it, I was only able to gather seven responses spanning across five countries: the United States, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, and Malaysia. Given this, I should note that I do not intend by any means to suggest that the responses, of which I will provide a brief overview, are representative or exhaustive in any way of the “average thoughts” of “Nobel Week attendees,” or of the thoughts concerning democracy belonging to the countries where survey participants come from. Rather, these responses will serve as an occasion to invite further thought into the themes and questions raised during the experience of the Nobel week dialogues as a whole. Furthermore, I will emphasize responses to the first and fourth questions here, as these had the most thought-provoking answers.
When survey participants were asked for three words that came to mind when thinking about “democracy,” answers included “representation,” “equitable,” “blue(?),” “politics,” “system,” “justice,” “freedom” “citizenship,” “vote,” “equality,” “rights,” “majority rule,” “free and fair elections,” “openness,” and “decide together.” However, more critical answers included “endangered,” “imperfect,” and even “doesn’t exist.” Let’s ponder for a moment on this last answer – what could it mean? Was this person suggesting that democracy has yet to be fulfilled, thus existing as a possibility, but one which faces several obstacles to its fulfillment? After all, in response to the fourth question, namely, “What would you need to be more powerful?,” respondents pointed out several challenges facing democracy today, including corruption, the monopolization of industries, lack of transparency in decision-making, difficulties faced due to an absence of citizenship, and a shortfall in accountability. However, perhaps these problems all pertain to structural challenges that go hand-in-hand with the pursuit of democracy, thus preventing forever its fulfillment, suggesting that democracy even as a possibility doesn’t exist.
I think it is safe to say, minimally, that whatever the case may be, democracy as it is idealized, namely, rule by the people, within which people both feel powerful as the member of a state (sovereignty), and feel free to choose their life’s path (autonomy), has yet to be fulfilled within history. The question is then reduced to one of faith, that is, of whether we want to place faith in democracy’s eventual arrival – almost akin to the faith placed in the second coming of a Messiah, who exists first as an idea, but is then envisioned as a future reality by virtue of our faith. Surely, questions of faith are important, but they also signal the end of our discussion, unless we were able to uncover something about the inner workings of democracy, something that isn’t immediately apparent, but would determine beforehand whether democracy could possibly be fulfilled in this world or not. I ask readers to “hold that thought” for the time being as we harken back to the Nobel dialogues, in the hopes that we may glean something that could cast light on our confusions.
Insights from useless knowledge
As a student of philosophy, the most striking conversation of the Nobel dialogues to me was a panel titled “The usefulness of useless knowledge?,” joined by Nobel Prize laureates Frances Arnold, who won the Chemistry Prize in 2018 for pioneering directed enzyme evolution methods with a diversity of applications, and Paul Nurse, recipient of the Medicine Prize in 2001 for his discoveries of key regulators in the cell cycle.
The session was named after a book that Nurse brought to the session, The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge by Abraham Flexner. Nurse begins with one story from the book, in which Flexner has a conversation with a philanthropist, “Mr. Eastman.” Flexner asks Eastman who he regards to be the most useful scientist in the world, to which Eastman replied “[Guglielmo] Marconi,” who invented the radio and, notably, shared a Nobel Prize in Physics with Karl Ferdinand for this work. Flexner responds that Marconi’s contribution was “practically negligible,” and that the real credit belonged to Marconi’s physicist predecessors, including Clerk Maxwell’s equations and Heinrich Hertz’s application of them, which resulted in demonstrating the existence of electromagnetic waves. Yet, Hertz himself denied that his discovery would prove to be of any practical use whatsoever – he had not anticipated that his research served as the basis for the invention of the radio, which was among the first widespread technological inventions that severed the distance between peoples worlds apart.
Thus, we have two basic kinds of scientific research: foundational science, like the discovery of electromagnetic waves, which is initially seen as “useless” prior to the fulfillment of its future potential, and applied science, the application of previously “useless” discoveries toward something conventionally useful, such as the radio.
Adam Smith, moderator of this panel (not to be confused with the many other Adam Smiths), raised the point that funding for foundational science is concentrated in the wealthier parts of the globe, whereas poorer countries are only able and/or willing to fund applied sciences. According to Nurse, this is because political leaders, from whom much of this funding comes from, understanding applied sciences as more conducive toward the “public good” and “commercial gain.” After all, applied sciences already have an “end” in mind, such as curing a disease or developing software, compared to foundational sciences whose discoveries serve as the ground for new possibilities, a virtue which is often too abstract for politicians to understand. This creates a situation in which scientists in poorer countries are either confined solely to applied sciences, or they must compete for spots in richer countries to conduct foundational science.
The idea of a distinction between useful and useless knowledge and its complications is not new: in fact, Nurse refers to an ancient Taoist parable from 2,400 years ago (which he mistakenly refers to as “Confucian”) told by Zhuang Zhi, in which a “useless” tree that was no good for making things still provided the shade necessary for everyone to do their work, a quality lost by the other “useful” trees the moment they are chopped down.
Yet, this all begs the question: what makes something “useful” versus “useless?” Surely, we can say that “usefulness” is a category that is historically contingent. After all, electromagnetic waves were “useless” until Marconi and Ferdinand were able to apply them in the radio. Yet, nowadays, though we may still use radios in our cars, there are much more advanced and convenient means of disseminating information, and thus the radio, in many cases, is hardly useful.
Nurse posits that what makes applied science as opposed to foundational science appealing to funders is its conduciveness toward the “public good” and “commercial gain” – thus, science is “useful” when it facilitates advancements in these two things. Yet, in respect to the kind of understanding employed by politicians and funders, can the “public good” and “commercial gain” be taken in isolation from one another, treated as two different factors? Surely not, given that, with the globalization of neoliberalism and capitalism, and the sway international economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have over poorer, indebted countries, the flow of funds follows a certain logic which assumes in advance what is useful in the sense of the “public good” and “commercial gain.” As for the kind of metrics belonging to this “usefulness,” consider the IMF’s structural adjustment program, in which indebted countries can request a loan from the IMF to pay off their debt, so long as they follow the IMF’s neoliberal conditions. These conditions include adherence to the rule of the market, cutting of public expenditures, deregulation, privatization, and individual responsibility (as in, public goods are highly discouraged).
The idea is that, should the country follow these conditions, their society will prosper more than if they abode by other principles, especially since lots of investment capital coming from wealthier places in the world are contingent upon these principles existing within a given society, thus contributing to the “public good.” Furthermore, such neoliberal policies create room for private corporations to set up shop in countries undergoing structural adjustment, and the emphasis on things like privatization and deregulation allow them to make massive profits, thus contributing to “commercial gain.” Given these metrics, it should make more sense why applied science is considered to be the more useful of the two: the “end” it has in mind is much more appealing to investors looking to privatize and capitalize off of the product of its knowledge. Foundational science, on the contrary, never has an end in mind, and though it lays the ground for “possibility,” this is something too abstract to garner private interests. Thus, foundational science is more fitting within the domain of “public goods,” knowledge for the sake of knowledge, something which neoliberalism discourages. Notably, we have also mentioned that foundational science still occurs and is funded within the wealthier countries of the world. These countries, which have already amassed hordes of wealth and resources, have the luxury of greater freedom when it comes to the kind of science they want to conduct, given that their survival isn’t contingent upon meeting the conditions of international loans.
Yet, hundreds of thousands of people have surely capitalized off the invention of the radio, even though it was built off of a “useless” foundational science. Although electromagnetic waves were “useless” at the time of their invention, the invention of the radio became possible by the time they were invented. These electromagnetic waves already harbored the possibility of a greater usefulness that surpassed the conventions of its day. Could the same then be said of what we consider useless science today, that such research in fact harbors the possibility of greater usefulness? Perhaps these possibilities could become unlocked the moment we don’t “box” usefulness within the framework of neoliberal market logic in advance. In fact, it is worth considering whether the very binary of “use” and “usefulness” is itself problematic. The inventions of many Nobel Prize winners, like Marconi and Ferdinand’s invention of the radio, would have been impossible without the “useless” and foundational discoveries prior. This is all to propose the following: it is true that we are dealing with pregiven ideas of what is “useful” and “useless” in our world. However, what is “useful” to the public good is not equivalent to what is the best possibility for nurturing the good. In fact, our conceptions of “usefulness” may prevent us from fulfilling the best possibility. This is why Frances Arnold, near the end of her talk, says that funders should invest more in people rather than projects. As the philosopher Immanuel Kant said, people are “ends in themselves,” and thus exist outside of the logic of means and ends, and thus outside of the framework of “usefulness.” And where dwells the greatest possibilities for our world than in the hearts of people?
Standing for democracy beyond usefulness
At last, let us pivot back to our discussion of democracy, and pose a simple question in the hope that it will resolve our prior confusions: is democracy useful? A worthy question indeed, given that many of the OCDT respondents claim that democracy is something which has fallen prone to corruption, corporate intervention, and lack of accountability, among other things, with one respondent even claiming that democracy doesn’t exist.
Let’s consider democracy in respect to the IMF’s criterion we previously mentioned. Does democracy uphold the “rule of market?” Surely not, given that democracy has had to intervene many times in such despotism, in the form of anti-monopoly and anti-trust laws. I dare say that democracy isn’t conducive toward the cutting of public expenditures, given that these expenditures, quite simply, are to the benefit of the public, who is supposed to be the sole sovereign of democracy. Likewise, the many labor struggles fought to democratize the workplace have had privatization and deregulation as their adversaries, as our valiant workers have struggled for better working conditions and greater decision-making authority. The “individual responsibility” criteria is perhaps the most nuanced, as we then ask, does power within democracy belong to every “I” within society, or the “we” as a whole – I can say at this juncture, however, that within democracy, the rule of people, “people” should be responsible for “people,” not “I” responsible for “I.” With all this established, we have now concluded that democracy is effectively useless.
Perhaps this shouldn’t come as a surprise to us, given the many criticisms today of democracy creating conditions that appear to be against the interest of voters. Here in the United States, for instance, it is baffling to believe that attacks on national healthcare programs, affordable housing, and food assistance programs truly belong to the “will of the people,” especially given that over 40% of U.S. citizens are either at or below the poverty line. So much for representative democracy.
Are we on our way toward democracy, or is democracy a failed project from the start? Let us call on the philosopher Jacques Derrida for assistance, who writes extensively on democracy in his Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Derrida contends that democracy is characterized by “autoimmunity,” meaning that democracy is the only form of government which has its own demise embedded within it, given that fascist powers can (and have) come to power through traditional democratic electoral processes, as we see in the United States today.
We previously questioned whether our respondent who suggested that democracy didn’t exist meant that democracy has yet to be fulfilled, or that it doesn’t exist as a possibility. Derrida, in his idea of “democracy to come,” would suggest that both are true: that is, democracy constantly calls and allows for its own criticism, much like what my OCDT respondents have levied against democracy. At the same time, democracy is only ever a democracy “to come” because democracy, according to Derrida, can never exist, precisely because it allows for its own undermining.
It is precisely because democracy must be questioned again and again that the “ground” upon which it rests is never static, but constantly shifts. Thus, the “future” of democracy is never determined, as distinct from other forms of government which, forbidding transformational critique, are already built upon “solid” grounds and thus have their trajectory mapped out. On the one hand, these alternative governmental forms don’t anticipate their own ruin. On the other hand, for democracy, ruin is “part and parcel” of its existence, a daily practice by which it becomes transformed repeatedly.
Readers may notice similarities to our previous discussion on science. Applied science has its trajectory laid out in the form of the means and ends framework. However, foundational science makes no attempt to anticipate the future, thus leaving open an expanse of possibilities. This is why Frances Arnold, in the “Usefulness of Useless Knowledge?” panel remarked that we never really know if something is useful or useless because we can’t predict the future. In fact, any attempt to do so may limit the possibilities of “useful things” by setting, say, the development of science or the movement of society upon an artificial trajectory. Foundational science sets free possibilities in all their whimsical wanderings.
This is perhaps why Derrida says that democracy must have the structure of a promise, on which “carries the future, the to-come, here and now” (86). It is true that democracy leaves itself vulnerable to its own assaults. Yet, it is precisely because democracy leaves its ground open to criticism, challenge, and transformation that we can build and dwell upon new grounds, whose soil is fertile with the promise of possibility, the same way that the pursuers of foundational science have paved the way for miraculous inventions that they had not even fathomed. We should desire democracy precisely because it is “useless,” and because it is only through democracy that we have any hope of one day escaping the framework of “usefulness” which has only served to limit possibilities.
An ode to useless youth
To end, I want to invite members of the International Youth Think Tank to allow this piece to be an opportunity for reflection upon our own role as youth fellows. Why should we dedicate time and resources toward empowering young thinkers? On paper, “empowering the youth” sounds glorious, yet us youth are constrained by many things. We lack the experience (at least, in terms of “years spent on this earth”) of older folks, we often don’t know what we want to become in life, we are often carried away by the frivolous and distracting things of the new age, and perhaps our brains aren’t fully developed, so on and so forth. Why invest in the youth rather than established academics and leaders? Yet, many of the latter, by pursuing a certain path, have already limited their trajectory, and thus their possibilities. The older generation often has a “grounding” for their principles and actions in mind, a modus operandi, a pledge of allegiance to some creed, among other things. But the youth have no set ground. Often, they are the harbingers of new – previously unthought – fertile soil. With no set trajectory, they hold the distinctive honor of having the world’s possibilities at their disposal. Us youth fellows are a promise for a better world, much like the foundational sciences, and much like democracy itself, a promise with uncertain ends, but a promise that has the sole potential to address the problems facing this world that demand creative solutions. So much for useful knowledge!
Youth Fellow with the IYTT since 2025, Jimmy is a fourth-year undergraduate student in Philosophy and Peace & Global Studies at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. He is also a community organizer with the Richmond Housing & Health Rights Coalition. His research seeks to uncover from 19th- and 20th-century German philosophy, political philosophy, and the philosophy of psychoanalysis a response to the problems of homelessness and poverty.